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ENCOURAGING EMERGENCE OF CROSS-BUSINESS STRATEGIC INITIATIVES 
Abstract 
 
We explore how strategic initiatives emerge at the business unit level in the context of multi-
business firms. Findings show that such initiatives create cross-business synergies in the absence 
of any direct intervention from the headquarters. Four factors appeared to foster the development 
of autonomous cross-business collaboration: a sense of urgency at the level of the firm, the 
existence of a few broad but strong corporate strategic guidelines, the existence of a set of cross-
business integration mechanisms, and an organizational culture promoting collaboration. Our 
findings suggest that, in addition to developing and enforcing top-down cross-business 
initiatives, headquarters would benefit from acknowledging the importance of business units' 
local knowledge by creating an organizational environment characterized by the four conditions 
identified in this paper. 
 
Introduction   
The question of how individual business units may obtain additional sources of competitive 
advantage by reaping the benefits of being affiliated to a multibusiness corporation has been at 
the heart of the academic literature on corporate strategy since its early days (Ansoff, 1965; 
Collis & Montgomery, 1998). Well-known theoretical and empirical studies analyzed the 
economic factors and organizational arrangements that enable multibusiness firms to benefit 
from the cross-business synergies associated with the businesses under their control (Anand, 
2005; Collins & Smith, 2006; Helfat & Eisenhardt, 2004; Hill, 1994; Kretschmer & Phanish, 
2008; Martin & Eisenhardt, 2010; O’reilly & Tushman, 2007; Palepu, 1985; Porter, 1987; 
Schmidt & Keil, 2010; Williamson, 1975). This literature usually refers to the creation of 
synergies across different businesses of a multibusiness firm as parenting advantage (Goold, 
Campbell, & Alexander, 1994) or corporate advantage (Collis & Montgomery, 1998), which 
presumes that headquarters (HQs) omnisciently overlooks business units. 
  In stark contrast, Burgelman (1983b) looked into the internal process of corporate 
venturing and coined the concepts of induced and autonomous behaviors. “The induced process 
concerns initiatives that are within the scope of the organization’s current strategy and build on 
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existing organizational learning; the autonomous process concerns initiatives that emerge outside 
of it and provide the potential for new organizational learning” (Burgelman, 1991: 241). For 
Burgelman (1983a), the strategic context can be redefined by middle managers championing of 
new initiatives, which ultimately can change the strategic thinking of top management. This is 
closely related to the notion of emergent strategy process developed by Mintzberg (1990) and 
Mintzberg & Lampel (1999), whereby strategy is the resulting pattern of a stream of decisions 
rather than a top-down plan. More recently, Mirabeau and Maguire (2014) elaborated a theory 
linking emergence and autonomous behavior and “show how emergent strategy originates as a 
project through autonomous behavior” (:1202).  
 Whereas notions as parenting advantage address strategic initiatives predominantly as a 
top-down process, notions as autonomous behavior and emergence address spontaneous bottom-
up phenomena. A less developed stream of work, however, focuses on whether and how cross-
business strategic initiatives might be the outcome of processes that, while induced by a sort of 
prevailing concept of strategy or strategy articulation (Noda and Bower, 1996), are formulated at 
the business unit level (Chakravarthy, Zaheer, & Zaheer, 2001; Martin & Eisenhardt, 2010), 
configuring a middle ground between the previously referred “top-down” initiatives and those 
that may develop at the business unit level through autonomous process, as described by 
Burgelman (1983). Such “middle ground” initiatives, defined here as Cross-Business Strategic 
Initiatives Formulated at the Business Unit Level, constitute the focus of our research.  
Being apparent that cross-business strategic initiatives are formulated at the business unit 
level in multibusiness firms, two issues yet not addressed by the literature become important. 
First, what organizational characteristics of multibusiness firms are conducive to the formulation 
of cross-business strategic initiatives at the business unit level? And second, in what way do such 
characteristics contribute toward the formulation of these initiatives? We draw from an 
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exploratory study of strategic initiatives within three multibusiness firms, which actively 
engaged in cross-business strategic initiatives in an effort to develop theoretical categories to 
answer these research questions. Our main argument is that there is a set of conditions at the 
organizational level that encourage the formulation of cross-business strategic initiatives at the 
business level. Strategic initiative is defined as “discrete, proactive undertaking that advances a 
new way for the corporation to use or expand its resources” (Birkinshaw, 1997: 207; Kanter, 
1982; Miller, 1983). In this research, these are group actions at the business level that identify 
opportunities, mobilize resources, and attempt to tap into such opportunities. 
Several new theoretical insights emerged from our data. In all of the three firms, we 
identified four features that were conducive to the development of cross-business unit strategic 
initiatives formulated at the business unit level: first, a sense of urgency, due to competitive 
pressures faced by the firm, that resounded across business units endowed with scarce resources; 
second, the existence of a few broad but strong strategic corporate guidelines; third, the existence 
of horizontal formal and informal cross-business integration mechanisms; and fourth, a generic 
cultural proneness to collaborate within the firm. Generically, these characteristics favored the 
formulation of cross-business strategic initiatives at the business unit level by creating impetus 
for such collaboration to occur. In addition, three of the characteristics identified helped to 
support the process of exploration, negotiation, and implementation of initiatives in more 
specific ways. Corporate strategic guidelines provided the necessary vertical coordination to 
motivate businesses to explore initiatives within the strategic focus of the corporation. 
Integration mechanisms facilitated the horizontal coordination across business by easing the 
circulation of relevant, in-depth information on the current activities of peer business units, and 
also by providing forums in which collaboration initiatives could be explored formally and 
informally. Finally, the firms’ cultural proneness toward collaboration led to proactive and 
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persistent efforts at the business unit level when pursuing cross-business initiatives. 
The remainder of this paper is organized in the following way. First, we review the 
literature on corporate strategy and strategic initiatives. Second, from the analyses of cross-
business strategic initiatives within three multibusiness firms, we analyze those formulated at the 
business unit level and elaborate the characteristics that favor their occurrence. Finally, we 
discuss our findings and their relevance for the management of multibusiness firms as well as 
their implications for the field of corporate strategy. 
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
The corporate strategy literature has predominantly described strategic initiatives aimed 
at pursuing cross-business strategic advantage as the outcome of explicit, active, and purposeful 
“top-down” initiatives developed by the firm’s HQs (Bailey & Friedlander, 1982; Eisenmann & 
Bower, 2000; Palepu, 1985; Panzar & Willig, 1981; Prahalad & Hamel, 1990). Research on 
corporate strategy of the firm has been one of the most prolific areas within the strategy literature 
for more than three decades (Chang & Singh, 2000). The pursuit of cross-business synergies is at 
the heart of the corporate strategy debate. In this paper, we define cross-business synergies as 
“the value that is created and captured, over time, by the sum of the businesses together relative 
to what it would be separately” (Martin & Eisenhardt, 2003: 3). The benefits associated with the 
existence of cross-business synergies, characterized in the literature as corporate or parenting 
advantage (Collis & Montgomery, 1998; Goold, et al., 1994; Poppo, 2003) has been associated 
with the existence of economies of scope (Helfat & Eisenhardt, 2004; Palepu, 1985; Panzar & 
Willig, 1981; Porter, 1987), market power (Hill, 1994; Hughes & Oughton, 1993), demand 
complementarities (Harrison, Hitt, Hoskisson, & Ireland, 2001; Henten & Godoe, 2010; Lang & 
Stulz, 1994; Schmidt & Keil, 2010; Tanriverdi & Venkatraman, 2005), and governance 
advantages, associated with the hierarchical coordination of businesses under a corporation, as 
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opposed to organization via market transactions (Alchian & Demsetz, 1972; Chatterjee & 
Lubatkin, 1990; Coase, 1937; Freeland, 2001; Hill, 1988; Williamson, 1975).  
Theoretical and empirical research that focused on corporate value creation through the 
pursuit of economies of scope typically deems the HQs of the firm as the natural leader of any 
strategic initiative (Bailey & Friedlander, 1982; Palepu, 1985; Panzar & Willig, 1981; Wan, 
Hoskisson, Short, & Yiu, 2011). For instance, Prahalad and Hamel (1990) contend that the HQs 
are an integrator that hosts and “nurtures” the firm’s portfolio of core competencies and deploys 
them across the firm. In general, synergies are more likely to occur in the presence of resource 
relatedness (Rumelt, 1974). On the one hand, the HQ appears to be the only area of the firm 
managing exhaustive information on the portfolio of business capabilities of the firm and having 
the necessary formal power to enforce cross-business initiatives. On the other hand, top-down 
strategic initiatives aimed at creating cross-business synergies frequently fall short of 
managements’ expectations due to the lack of understanding of the context of different business 
units (Goold & Campbell, 1998). As the realization of synergies proved to be an elusive event in 
many organizations (Davis & Thomas, 1993; Kleinbaum & Tushman, 2007; Palich, Cardinal, & 
Miller, 2000; Stimpert & Duhaime, 1997), research on cross-business synergies evolved toward 
a process theory approach, aiming at understanding how cross-business synergies were actually 
created. However, this approach overlooks organic strategy generation approaches (Mintzberg, 
Ahlstrand, & Lampel, 1998). A more recent study explores whether strategic initiatives 
formulated by business units may constitute an alternative locus for the development of 
corporate-wide synergies (Martin & Eisenhardt, 2010). Martin and Eisenhardt (2010) claim that 
collaboration “centers on flexibly emergent, cooperative connections among modular, relatively 
autonomous and unique businesses” (2010: 294). This emergent stream of process research on 
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cross-business collaboration has the potential move forward the rather stalled debate on intrafirm 
cross-business collaboration.  
 Strategic initiatives may present themselves in a range of forms: from improvement 
projects and new product developments to new ventures or acquisitions (Lechner & Kreutzer, 
2010; Zollo & Winter, 2002). Because of the fact that strategic initiatives are group activities, 
different forms of influence will affect them. Lechner and Floyd (2012) identified that formal 
authority and coalition building can moderate development of exploratory initiatives, but also 
could not find any support for that rational justification to be a useful form of influence. We 
argue that both formal authority and coalition building are essential to cross-business strategic 
initiatives but the latter lends itself more to the business-level development while the former will 
tend to establish the necessary conditions. At the time of working on cross-business initiatives, 
business-level managers are willing to cooperate and engage, and not just push corporate projects 
(Kleinbaum & Tushman, 2007). After identifying all of such initiatives, for the purposes of this 
paper, we focused on the subset of those that had been formulated at the business unit level 
through the collaboration of different business units. We traced how these initiatives were crafted 
and developed in order to identify organizational features of the parent firms that were conducive 
to their formulation. Such initiatives are potential sources of value creation within firms 
(Chakravarthy, et al., 2001; Martin & Eisenhardt, 2010). While working collaboratively on such 
cross-business initiatives, business-level managers have a vested interest in seeing their own 
ideas come to fruition (Maritan, 2001) and are willing to cooperate and engage with other units 
to bring this about (Lechner & Floyd, 2012), instead of merely pushing corporate-initiated 
projects that are frequently solutions looking for problems rather than solutions that are intended 
to resolve problems encountered at the ‘coal-face’ of businesses themselves (Young & Tavares, 
2004). Organizational control has been recently found to counteract political drawbacks on 
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strategic initiatives (Kreutzer, Walter, & Cardinal, 2015). In the case of subsidiaries within 
multinational firms, past initiatives contribute to its bargaining power, and how HQs respond – 
through granting attention or monitoring – affect the realization of the subsidiary’s goals 
(Ambos, Andersson, & Birkinshaw, 2010; Birgitte, 2011). However, most autonomous strategic 
initiatives are trumped by the firm’s articulated strategy and structure (Ecker, Van Triest, & 
Williams, 2011; Kleinbaum & Tushman, 2007). In the specific context of cross-business unit 
collaboration, Martin and Eisenhardt (2010) argue that business unit-centric processes were more 
likely to lead to high-performing cross-business unit collaboration than “top-down” corporate-
centric decisions. However, the question of whether and how multibusiness firms may adapt the 
way these are organized in order to create forums or features that foster the formulation of cross-
business strategic initiatives at the business unit level remains open. We seek to bridge this gap 
by identifying such characteristics and understanding in what way these contribute to the 
formulation of cross-business strategic initiatives.  
 Strategic initiatives are driven by autonomous and induced behaviors (Burgelman, 
1983a). Autonomous behavior, in turn, constitutes the origin of emergent strategy (Mirabeau & 
Maguire, 2014). Mirabeau and Maguire (2014) elaborate a process model to address the 
transition between autonomous behavior and emergent strategy whereby initial mobilization of 
support for impetus is followed by manipulation of the strategic context for consonance and in 
turn followed by altering the structural context for embeddedness. When this chain is interrupted 
initiatives become ephemeral and fail to become emergent strategy. Their model is very accurate 
in describing the mechanisms that foster or hinder the transition from autonomous to emergent 
strategy. Our study focuses on the generation and maintenance of strategic initiatives at the 
business level, which will involve both behaviors autonomous and induced. 
METHODS 
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The research was conducted in three multibusiness firms. At the request of the firms to maintain 
confidentiality, we will refer to them as Car Systems, Optical Products, and Roadside Services. 
In the absence of work on autonomous cross-business strategic initiatives, we “let the cases 
speak,” albeit through the lens provided by the work of Burgelman (1983b, 1994), Mintzberg 
and Waters (1985), and Birkinshaw (1997) on autonomous/emergent strategic initiatives.  
The sampling criteria responded to the idea of purposeful sampling (Glaser & Strauss, 
1967). We sought and selected information-rich cases that emphasized the phenomenon of cross-
business strategic initiatives. In doing so, we initially approached 11 firms from the region of 
Catalonia in Spain through preliminary interviews. As a result of this process, we selected the 
four in which we found abundant preliminary evidence of the existence of cross-business 
strategic initiatives. One of these firms had to be eventually discarded due to the impossibility of 
obtaining adequate access for our fieldwork. The three organizations chosen were particularly 
fertile research settings and proved more than adequate for our purposes. All of them endured 
major changes in their corporate strategies materialized in a multitude of corporate-wide strategic 
initiatives. In addition, all of them offered great potential for cross-business collaboration due to 
the existence of a certain degree of relatedness (whether commercial or technological) between 
the activities of their business units. We approached the three cases under a multiple-case design. 
A multiple-case design enables to make cross-case comparisons, making results more robust than 
those of single cases (Eisenhardt, 1989). 
Our study focused on cross-business unit strategic initiatives formulated at the business 
unit level as unit of analysis, but draws on the contextual factors of each initiative to study its 
genesis and development. An embedded design increases the complexity of the analysis, but 
enables us to enrich inductive theory-building efforts (Yin, 2009). This design was justified 
because we were interested in the initiatives as well as in the effect of the context where these 
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initiatives took place, i.e. the firms’ overall strategies and organizational practices. Our data 
collection process focused on strategic initiatives (Lovas & Ghoshal, 2000) intended to create 
corporate advantage based on economies of scopes (Helfat & Eisenhardt, 2004; Palepu, 1985; 
Panzar & Willig, 1981; Porter, 1987) or market power (Hill, 1994; Hughes & Oughton, 1993). 
Specifically, we focused on initiatives characterized by cross-business knowledge sharing 
(Miller & Shamsie, 1996; Porter, 1987) and cross-business activity sharing (Porter, 1987). The 
concepts of dominant logic (Prahalad & Bettis, 1986), parenting style (Goold, et al., 1994), and 
cross-business integration mechanisms (Mintzberg, 1973) guided our data collection process 
referred to the organizational features of the firms in which the abovementioned initiatives were 
embedded.  
Data collection 
Data from the companies were the result from extensive research that was conducted between 
2003 and 2008. We performed 31 semistructured interviews in total with three types of 
informants: corporate directors, business unit directors, and members of the board of directors 
(Table 1). 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
Twelve interviews were made at Car Systems, 12 at Roadside Services, and seven at 
Optical Services, reaching a total of 24 informants, some of which were interviewed two and 
three times. Notes were taken during the interviews and full reports were written up immediately 
after each interview. In addition to interviews, we obtained archival information from the 
companies, including strategic plans, annual reports, institutional brochures, and promotional 
films. Finally, we gathered public information from the company’s website, the business press, 
business databases, and specialized publications.  
One of our first objectives was to identify the universe of cross-business strategic 
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initiatives developed throughout the firms by the time of our study. We let interviewees 
described a range of initiatives and for each one we asked them to describe their genesis and 
development. We asked interviewees to provide a detailed description of each initiative. From 
their description, we assessed whether they had been a result of a top-down corporate-centric 
mandate or they had been formulated at the business unit level. Although the description was 
open ended, we took care in collecting data about the following aspects: the “genesis” of the 
initiative, its content and purpose, and the outcome of the collaboration experience, including an 
assessment of its degree of success or failure. After data were collected for all initiatives, the two 
researchers independently assessed whether they could be classified as Cross-Business Strategic 
Initiatives Formulated at the Business Unit Level and agreed on the initiatives presented in Table 
2. In order to test for potential biases on interviewees’ accounts of the facts related to the 
different initiatives included in Table 2 and their interpretations of whether these were either top 
down or formulated at the business unit level, we corroborated by contrasting accounts from 
different interviewees in each firm and through the analysis of documentation from the 
respective firm. For example, we had three business-level interviews for Car Systems and 
Optical Products, which offered the genesis and development for each initiative, but sought 
confirmation from corporate managers who were also cognizant. If corporate managers’ 
descriptions of the initiatives matched our definition of cross-business originated at the business 
level, we accepted their nature. In this way, our data were subject to triangulation by data source 
and by method (Denzin, 1978). As a result of this process, we chose those initiatives that had 
been formulated at the business unit level and focused our analysis exclusively on these. These 
are presented in Table 2.  
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
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Data analysis 
Cross-business initiatives developed at the business unit level, constitute the object of our 
analysis. In order to discover the reasons that had produced these initiatives, we used narrative to 
describe the sequential development of each initiative (Langley, 1999). Subsequently, to map the 
conditions that were common to all initiatives, we identified common patterns. We 
complemented such analyses by describing the collaborative behavior of businesses across 
initiatives. Our purpose was to enrich our search for patterns by understanding whether and how 
these patterns were affected by the behavior of the business units, which was the organizational 
context in which initiatives were developed. It is worth remarking that the assessment of the 
relative merits of initiatives formulated by business units versus those developed in a top-down 
manner, as well as the analysis of why the latter ones were more abundant in number than the 
former ones is beyond the scope of this paper.  
 For each initiative, the two authors independently codified a list of candidate reasons that 
enabled or allowed their occurrence. In doing this, we followed a replication logic where each 
initiative was approached as a different experiment (Yin, 2009). We then contrasted these 
candidate reasons with data to cross-check for consistency. Independently, the two authors 
developed a list of candidate reasons per initiative. The authors then presented these candidate 
reasons to each other. Some of them coincided, others could be grouped differently and in very 
few of them there were disagreements. Candidate reasons for a single initiative were deemed as 
valid only when both authors independently agreed on their existence. Subsequently, we grouped 
the list of reasons across all four initiatives under study. This process led to the identification of 
four factors characterizing all the initiatives studied that were conducive to the development of 
cross-business strategic initiatives developed at the business unit level. We present the results of 
this process in Table 3.  
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[Insert Table 3 about here] 
We focused on the identification of the underlying conditions that encouraged the 
development of each initiative. The resulting theorization showed that, although all four 
characteristics together produced impetus for the formulation of cross-business unit initiatives at 
the business unit level, one by one, each characteristic had a particular effect. The narrative 
accounts of each chosen initiative and the cases they belong are discussed below. 
 
FOUR CASES OF CROSS-BUSINESS STRATEGIC INITIATIVES 
This section provides an overview of the companies investigated and the narrative 
describing the cross-business strategic initiatives that emerged spontaneously at the level of 
individual business units. Table 2 lists all strategic initiatives identified in the three companies 
and highlights cross-businesses selected. As shown in Table 2, the proportion of cross-business 
strategic initiatives was relatively low. Four of these strategic initiatives formulated at the 
business unit level are summarized below. Three of these initiatives resulted from the business 
units’ spontaneous initiative to collaborate. The fourth results from a business unit initiative that 
eventually became part of corporate policy. The sequences of events that generated each cross-
business strategic initiative are described in Table 3. 
In the interest of anonymity, we have called the cases Car Systems, Optical Products, and 
Roadside Services. After the description of each organization, we present each of their cross-
business strategic initiatives that we deem to have emerged spontaneously. Although this study 
recognizes the importance of top-down strategic initiatives, they are not reported here. The three 
initiatives identified are summarized below.  
Car System Case 
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Car Systems is a holding of a group of companies operating along the supply chain in the 
auto industry. It is organized around four subsidiary business units: Braking Systems, Rear-View 
Systems, Interiors, and Locking Systems. It was established in Spain after the end of World War 
II because the imposed trade isolation led to a severe shortage of spare parts for cars in Spain. 
When Spain joined the European Union (EU) in 1986, they took this as an opportunity to operate 
in a bigger market. The car industry underwent important changes beginning from the early 
1980s. Car Systems’ response was to develop critical economies of scale in manufacturing, 
R&D, and purchasing with the entire EU market, which transformed them into a major European 
component manufacturer. By the mid-1990s, they decided on a geographical expansion plan 
aimed at winning new customers worldwide. It was within this period of the firm’s growth that 
the following strategic initiative emerged.  
Car Systems’ first strategic initiative: Multiplants for market entry  
Car Systems’ growth was not orthodox. Although it was standard industry practice to build one 
plant for each car component, Car Systems mixed different components within a plant. Different 
business units tendered to produce car parts for car manufacturers, but when it was not worth it 
to build a plant for one unit, they joined forces. This unassuming practice enabled nimble market 
response and a cost advantage. It was when entering the North America Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA) region that different business units developed “multiplants.” Perhaps naively after 
winning a tender for rear-view mirrors, they approached the plastic and electrical system unit, 
which already had an operating plant with available capacity, to use their facility. Then, another 
unit tapped on the opportunity.  
Multiplants were far from ideal but (each division had different operational and 
administrative procedures) they helped us in that critical first internationalization 
step. All the three international business units: Rear-View Systems; Command and 
Control Systems; and Plastics and Electrical Systems used this method to enter the 
markets of Mexico and Brazil (Electrical Systems Business Unit Director, 
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Interview). 
 
The idea for multiplant operations drew on bilateral discussions and negotiations between the 
international business units, without any influence from the HQ. As described by the manager in 
charge of rear-view mirrors, “‘...coffee chat’ between us enables us to prevent making clumsy 
mistakes such as everybody going to the same country on their own.” Although business units 
were encouraged to operate independently multiplants benefited the entire corporation reducing 
risk. Multiplants entailed a lower downside risk of market entry for the corporation as a whole, 
but kept the upside potential for subsequent expansion in that particularly market intact. Besides, 
in a worldwide market for car components, the customers drove them. In words of one of the 
three, the manager in charge of the Rear-View Mirrors Business Unit, 
“Going to NAFTA was tough for us. At the time, we were barely coping with 
our fast European expansion when a customer request -at the highest level- made it 
clear that we had to support them also in America. Sharing production facilities by 
having multi-plants in Mexico was quite complicated, but we had no option and it was 
the only way to face customers’ demands, and we ended up managing. As a side 
effect, though, we learned from this experience and it helped us to improve other 
business processes, such as reporting for instance.” 
 
After the success of the Mexican experience, this format became a template for further 
new market entries because it was cost-effective and gave a better and quicker service to the car 
manufacturer customers. “Using multi-plants as market entry strategy enabled things we could 
not have done as a single unit,” said the manager of the electric unit. This strategic imperative 
was coupled with severe financial restrictions derived from the opposition to raise capital in 
public financial markets by controlling shareholders.  
 Car Systems’ second strategic initiative: bottom-up organizational integration.  
Organizational process integration helps creating supply-side economies of scope through 
sharing activities. Despite its increasingly international position in manufacturing and sales, by 
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2003 the firm still sourced most of its raw materials from the 100-kilometer area around its HQs. 
Similarly, the Spanish plants sometimes arbitrarily controlled the inbound logistics for all the 
international plants within each division, leading to inefficient supplies and frequent political 
clashes. The three international divisions of the firm, as the ones most affected and in order to 
cut costs, decided to take action and to develop an agreed solution. The solution was based on 
the integration of the procurement activities for the three divisions, which produced dramatic 
reductions in costs via sharing of activities and knowledge, ultimately coming to life without the 
need of any corporate initiative. As summarized by the logistics manager, 
“We needed to sort out an awfully inefficient procurement function in order to 
reduce costs. There was no system we had just grown organically with a parochial 
approach. Using our creativity and prompt response within a freshly designed system 
allowed us to become a global tier 1 supplier.” 
 
Optical Product Case 
Optical Products comprises three related business units, i.e., corrective lenses (both plastic and 
crystal); frames for eyewear and sunglasses, as well as optical equipment and instruments for 
optometrists and ophthalmologists. For a lengthy period, Optical Products enjoyed a stable and 
comfortable Spanish market, but they suffered major competitive challenges from 1986 with the 
opening up of the EU market. Again, in the early nineties, increasing competitive threats put 
pressure on Optical Products to internationalize by moving manufacturing to lower cost 
locations. However, by 2004 the soundness of that internationalization strategy remained 
unclear. It was at this point that our research began. All of Optical Products’ individual business 
units had full autonomy for marketing, sales, customer service, and R&D, while corporate HQs 
took care of manufacturing, logistics, procurement, corporate finance, and human resource 
management. 
Optical Products’ strategic initiative: bundling market offerings.  
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“We are the only company in the world that provided the three: lenses, frames 
and cutting machines. Historically, each of the three business units ‘went to war 
alone’ without sharing either sales forces or marketing strategies. Then again in the 
past, we had very little competition, but now it’s different. Our main competitors 
are global leaders and the market is saturated.” (Lens Business Unit Director, 
Interview)  
 
Optical Products was in dire need of internationalization because they faced a mature home 
market, which generated >75% of its revenues and almost all of their profits. Yet how to do this 
remained unclear, especially as fresh revenues needed to be generated from the domestic market 
to fund the proposed internationalization process. Faced with this quagmire and imbued with this 
sense of urgency, the cutting machines manager took the initiative to approach his peers in the 
two other business units in lenses and frames to explore new opportunities. Although cooperation 
had not materialized in the past, this time unit managers came together, and fueled by the urgent 
need to compete, devised a way to create synergies independent of any directive from the top.  
“...the Spanish market was the cash cow that enabled us to fund our 
international expansion. As 98% of the Spanish opticians already owned edging 
machines, our only opportunity for growth was by offering creative and attractive 
financing. Leasing contracts that bundled machines to frames purchases were 
valuable for some of our customers, especially those starting their practices.” 
(Cutting Machines Business Unit Manager, Interview)  
 
Attractive financing arrangements involving the bundling of machine leases to frames purchases 
provided an added value proposition to clients based on combining the benefits of different and 
distinct products within a single offering. This bundling enabled the firm to obtain demand-side 
economies of scope based on unique demand complementarities and supply-side economies of 
scale deriving from activity sharing. Because of the bundled nature of the offer, the client 
benefited by adding the purchase of frames to the conditions of the leasing associated with the 
purchase of the cutting machine. The Head of the Equipment Business Unit commented, “every 
optician had a cutting machine in Spain. By bundling cutting machines with frame purchases, we 
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stimulated opticians to upgrade their cutting machines, just like mobile phone operators do.” 
What started off as a gnawing concern with dwindling domestic markets and the pressure 
to internationalize led unexpectedly to the emergence of cross-business strategic initiatives 
through the creative bundling of unit offerings that actually stimulated what was otherwise 
deemed an already-saturated domestic market. In and by themselves, these initiatives were short-
lived, but they sowed the seeds for the development of a new synergy-generating unit serving as 
nursery for new projects. The CEO explained: 
 “the new Business Development Department was intended to systematize the cross-
business initiatives that had developed recently and to develop new ones. We had to 
tap on this unique opportunity of satisfying a wide range of customer needs through 
our three business units.” 
 
In other words, the bundling initiatives launched at the business unit level came to be recognized 
as an important source of value creation and this led top management to create a Corporate 
Business Development Unit, which was tasked to explore further possibilities. Yet, this would 
not have happened had it not been for the practical-coping actions of the business unit managers. 
Roadside Service Case 
Roadside Services is an automobile club located in Barcelona. Currently, it offers a 
number of automobile-related services to the public (on-route assistance, car insurance, car 
checking, obtaining the driving license, permits to drive abroad, etc.) that resembles the 
Automobile Association (AA) or Royal Automobile Club (RAC) in the UK. For Roadside 
Services, the need to position the brand in new markets quickly, preempting its main national and 
regional competitors triggered a creative way to achieve it. In this regard, one of the managers 
involved commented: 
“Our only competitor within national scope had been very complacent, but we all 
knew that if they ‘woke up’ we would be dead. I do not know if we were cleverer than 
the rest, but maybe the fact that we were on top of our business is what made us move 
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swiftly.” 
 
Roadside Services embarked in a geographical expansion across Spain in what they called 
“conquering new geographical territories.” The Yellow Car project is part of this effort. 
Roadside Services’ strategic initiative: brand leverage  
The yellow car project comprised extending the model of roadside assistance to the rest of Spain 
and in so doing communicate their brand. This impulse for growth appeared inadvertently. 
Although Roadside Services’ intention to grow was well established, the marketing budget did 
not match such ambitions. This was very frustrating for the marketing manager, who explained it 
as follows,  
“Outside Catalonia we were either unknown or known for the wrong reasons. 
Creating an image was a must if we were going to achieve a sustainable expansion. 
But what am I to do when it turned out there was no money to do this”  
 
The lack of financial resources forced the marketing manager to develop other innovative ideas 
instead and only to use the limited resources already available. Disappointed and frustrated by 
the lack of available resources and to let off steam, he shared his predicament with other 
executives over a cup of coffee. In his exasperation, complaining to those around him, the road 
assistance manager who was present inadvertently overheard him.  
The road assistance manager oversaw a fleet of road assistance vehicles, compact bright 
yellow small cars that nimbly negotiated the often heavy traffic in Spanish cities to arrive 
quickly and promptly to provide roadside assistance to those in need. In almost 90% of these 
emergency cases, the issue was often a flat battery so that larger and more bulky vehicles were 
often not needed. Their distinctive contribution was the speed and quality of service they were 
able to provide for common roadside problems. As an added feature, these little cars also 
showcased the name of the company in big letters on a bright yellow background and this gave 
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them incomparable visibility and enduring presence.  
At that time, top management was pondering on which services would be rolled out first to 
the rest of Spain and these yellow cars were not high up on the list. Joining forces appeared like 
the natural thing to do. The road assistance manager offered the marketing manager a way to 
increase the visibility of the brand across the new markets targeted and this came to be the 
“yellow market project.” Recollecting the event, the roadside assistance manager said, 
“Let’s not fool ourselves, all those yellow cars out and about in Alicante or Valencia 
and providing an excellent service… it’s got to have a publicity impact, a 
communicational impact. People see it, you know. How can we quantify the benefit 
of that impact? I have no idea but I know it is there.”  
 
Reflecting on the success of rolling the yellow car, the service managers commented, “this 
project was not part of the strategic plan, but if I had been the service manager then, it would 
have been.” This assertion evidences the spontaneous emergent nature of the project. 
However, it also shows how the service manager felt a tad embarrassed of the spontaneous 
origin of the project and attempted to increase its status claiming a plan would have been in 
place.  
In order to synthesize the narrative analyses shown above, table 3 presents the sequence 
of events that generated each cross-business strategic initiative. Subsequently, we discuss the 
theoretical implications.  
[Insert table 3 about here] 
ORGANIZATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS THAT FAVOR THE EMERGENCE OF 
CROSS-BUSINESS STRATEGIC INITIATIVES FORMULATED AT THE BUSINESS 
UNIT LEVEL 
 
The cross-business initiatives discussed in the previous section appear in stark contrast with the 
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most conventional corporate-centric ones, which were present in a higher proportion in the cases 
we studied, as referred in Table 2. Conventional initiatives responded to a specific corporate 
mandate and they had been developed following the standard corporate level-business unit 
hierarchy. By contrast, as seen in Table 4, across the four cross-business strategic initiatives 
studied, we identified four characteristics that together provided a fertile ground for such 
initiatives to emerge. First, a sense of urgency at the corporate level (“sense of urgency under 
resource scarcity”) due to competitive pressures faced by the firm and the inability of the units to 
respond to certain challenges in isolation; second, the existence of clear corporate strategic 
guidelines; third, the existence of formal and informal horizontal cross-business integration 
mechanisms (“integration mechanisms”); and finally, a cultural proneness to collaborate within 
the firm (“culture of collaboration”). Such characteristics boosted impetus to find new 
opportunities and enhanced persistence to maintain momentum. Of importance was the 
willingness to overcome difficulties and make them work out, as well as the provision of 
necessary vertical and horizontal coordination of efforts.  
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
Sense of urgency under resource scarcity (New strategic needs)  
The existence of a call for immediate strategic action from HQs as a result of competitive 
pressures helped to trigger the firms’ impetuses to search for partner business units with whom 
they could engage in rapid joint strategic initiatives. At the same time, the sense of urgency 
ensured momentum as initiatives developed. Partnerships between business units constituted 
effective platforms for strategic initiatives when urgent implementation of such initiatives was 
necessary. In addition, across all of the initiatives, we observed that business units lacked the 
portfolio of resources and capabilities required to engage in the initiative on their own. Such 
scarcity of resources reinforced their sense that the corporate call would only be addressed by 
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pooling together their resources with those of their peer business units in order to build the 
required portfolio of resources together.  
Across the cases studied, this sense of urgency was the consequence of rapid market 
changes. Although these changes represented a pressure for strategic change at HQs, in turn 
these corporate pressures were translated into pressure for action at the business unit level. 
Although in the cases of Car Systems and Roadside Services such sense of urgency led to 
expansive moves of proactive nature, in the case of Optical Products, the sense of urgency 
related to the need to defend the firm’s position in its core market (the firm’s “cash cow”), and 
their goal was to generate further resources for its internationalization plans. 
For instance, Car Systems’ growth through “multiplants” was justified by the urgent need 
to expand internationally beyond its natural European market. Their aims were to “follow” the 
Original Equipment Manufacturer OEM’s expansion and also to achieve critical economies of 
scale and scope in R&D and purchases. Confirming this, a business unit managing director 
involved in the expansion of the firm to Latin America noted that,  
“…rented ‘multi-plants’ enabled all the three international business units, Rear View 
Systems, Command and Control Systems and Plastics and Electrical Systems to enter 
Mexico and Brazil. While multi-plants were far from ideal (each division had different 
operational and administrative procedures) they helped us in that critical first 
internationalization step in those countries.” 
 
This strategic imperative was coupled with severe financial restrictions derived from the 
opposition to raise capital in public financial markets by controlling shareholders. In this regard, 
an external board member appointed specifically to provide financial advice commented that: 
“…by the mid-1990s, the success of the international expansion was based on working 
with very low margins. As supply contracts with OEMs lasted for the whole life of a model, 
this meant that the company would be financially stretched for the next four or five years. It 
would have been madness to go public at this stage, as the combination of tiny free cash 
flows in the foreseeable future plus the high risk associated to the incipient globalization 
strategy would have resulted in a low IPO price for the shares.” 
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By sharing rented “multiplants,” the international business units of Car Systems found a way to 
accommodate expanding their operations abroad while incurring very low capital expenditures. 
Similarly, Optical Products’ bundling offers resulted from the urgency to grow in the 
mature and saturated Spanish market as a way to obtain the financial resources required to 
pursue international expansion plans. The head of Optical Products’ Equipment division 
explained that:  
“...the Spanish market was the cash cow that enabled us to fund our international 
expansion. However, as the 98% of the Spanish opticians already owned edging 
machines, our only opportunity for growth was by offering creative and attractive 
financing. Leasing contracts bundling machines and frames were valuable for some of 
our customers, especially those starting their practices.” 
 
For Roadside Services, the need to position the brand in new markets quickly, 
preempting its main national and regional competitors triggered a creative way to achieve it. In 
this regard, one of the managers commented: 
“Our only competitor with national scope had been very complacent, but we all 
knew that if they ‘woke up’ we would be dead. I do not know if we were cleverer than 
the rest, but maybe the fact that we were on top of the business is what made us move 
swiftly.” 
 
As can be seen in these examples, the existence of strategic imperatives demanding urgent action 
acted as impetuses leading business units to the exploration of cross-functional strategic 
initiatives, where impetus is momentum favoring action.  
 
These findings are summarized in the following proposition: 
 
Proposition 1. Impetus favoring the formulation of cross-business strategic initiatives at the 
business unit level benefit from the existence of a corporate sense of urgency in a context of 
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resource scarcity at the business unit level  
 
Corporate strategic guidelines (realization of different unit’s needs).  
We found that corporate guidelines were also effective as sources of impetus for the 
development of cross-business strategic initiatives. These strategic guidelines were present in the 
form of explicit and widely communicated mission and vision statements at Car Systems and 
Optical Services. Perhaps more importantly, they were reinforced in executive committee 
meetings, where business unit and divisional top managers attended. The managing director of 
one of the Car Systems’ divisions explained that the interdivisional discussions, which 
eventually lead to the proposal of integration of procurement, were triggered by the strong 
corporate message regarding the need for a global company to adopt global management 
processes. He recalls that: 
“We realized that we had two problems. First, we were a global company sourcing 70% 
of our raw materials just 100 km around Barcelona. Second, there was a lot of overlap in the 
purchase requirements of the three divisions. We realized that it was worthwhile to give up some 
divisional control over the purchasing process for the sake of overhead reduction and volume 
discounts in a scenario of margin squeeze.” 
 
This insight can be summarized in the following proposition:  
 
Proposition 2. Clear corporate strategic guidelines create impetus for business units to 
formulate cross-business unit collaboration initiatives and also provide a form of loosely 
coupled vertical coordination that increases the likelihood that business-level cross-business 
strategic initiatives may emerge. 
 
These corporate guidelines provide internally existing selection criteria to the business units 
  
24 
(Burgelman, 1991) or “simple rules” (Galunic & Eisenhardt, 2001). They were used by corporate 
management to spread “the virus of the vision” (impetus) and also provide some degree of 
vertical integration, defining the boundaries of the firm in such a way that middle managers 
within the business units self-organized to achieve a common goal (Clippinger, 1999). 
Formal and informal horizontal integration mechanisms: Mechanisms that fostered 
communication and interaction increased the likelihood that information about potential cross-
business initiatives was made available. These mechanisms created impetus for collaboration and 
provided forums in which such opportunities could be explored and negotiated bilaterally by 
business units. In the cases we studied, several mechanisms that fostered the development of 
such integration were present. These mechanisms included the existence of: a corporate Intranet 
spreading relevant (and specifically targeted) business news about the organization (Car 
Systems); interdivisional committees for discussion of technological, quality, and operational 
practices (Car Systems); the participation of business unit leaders in the firms’ strategic reviews 
(Car Systems and Optical Products); the physical proximity between the business unit leaders 
(Car Systems, Roadside Services, and Optical Products); social cross-business activities around 
themes important for the corporation overall (Optical Products); and a “hands off” corporate 
organizational design that enabled business unit leaders to run their units with little corporate 
interference (Car Systems and Optical Products). The head of one of the business units referred 
to how informal communication with his/her peers enabled to improve internationalization 
decisions: 
 
“‘...coffee chat’ between us enables us to prevent making clumsy mistakes such as that 
everybody going to the same country on their own. Coordinating market entry strategy 
enabled us to do things that we could not have done individually and also helped us to 
optimize capacity decisions.” 
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Roadside Services’ integration mechanisms operated via the Planning and Control unit. Planning 
regularly visited the different business units operating in an unusual way, as collector and 
redistributor of information and ideas, going beyond normal planning tasks,  
“Here the work of the Planning unit has shaken up old habits. They talk to all units, 
so if we need something they will know where to find it or they will come to us with 
ideas from other places. They are on top of things” 
 
These integration mechanisms created the conditions that favored the development of cross-
business collaboration processes. Such processes were made possible as integration 
mechanisms drove cross-business collaboration by means of the availability of in-depth 
information of peer business units’ activities, and the existence of forums in which 
opportunities for collaboration could be explored and developed. This observation is 
captured through proposition 3:  
 Proposition 3. Firms characterized by the existence of formal and informal coordination 
mechanisms are more likely to formulate cross-business collaboration initiatives at the 
business unit level, as such mechanisms catalyze the process of exploration (impetus), 
negotiation, and implementation of such initiatives. 
 
Previous literature identified specific mechanisms that favor the horizontal coordination of 
the firm. Examples of such mechanisms are liaison managers, (Mintzberg, 1978) cross-
business committees related to different activities, a corporate Intranet or cross-participation 
of executives in the strategic reviews of peer divisions (Chakravarthy, et al., 2001). 
Collaboration embedded in corporate culture.  
Corporate culture has been defined as “A pattern of shared basic assumptions invented, 
discovered, or developed by a given group as it learns to cope with its problems of external 
adaptation and internal integration” (Schein, 1992). In the three firms, corporate cultures 
encouraged the persistent exploration of cross-business strategic initiatives. As one divisional 
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manager from Car System remembered, 
“…the need to develop operations within NAFTA was out of the question and we could 
not do it on our own. We knew that the guys from the M division had the same problem. It 
took some time for us crack a deal, especially as uncertainty on future orders was very high. 
Yet, the will to agree was strong as we both preferred to partner with a peer division than 
finding a third party.”  
 
Car Systems cites one of its corporate values “Teamwork and Joint Learning.” This is 
further defined as “sharing knowledge, communicating openly, learn from mistakes, cooperate 
and understand that none of us is more than all of us” (Extracted from Car Systems’ leaflet “Our 
Vision of the Future” distributed among all employees).  
Optical Products presented its Mission and Vision Statement to all its employees in 2000, 
highlighting as the firm’s first value “Teamwork.” The specific phrasing was  
“to promote teamwork, both within and between departments, involving and 
committing ourselves through each one’s contribution through complementary actions with 
other members, avoiding individualistic behaviors and encouraging participation, 
communication, information exchange and understanding” (Optical Products, Annual Report, 
2000).  
 
A culture putting collaboration as a central corporate value provides impetus to cooperate 
and also encourages managers to be well informed of what was going on in the peer business 
units. A strong call was made for “being in the loop” regarding the firm’s major initiatives across 
its different businesses coupled with an intensified informal communication between business 
units within Car Systems. One divisional managing director of Car Systems commented that: 
 “...in our meetings at headquarters it was taken for granted that everybody was aware of all 
the major initiatives going on throughout the firm. Otherwise, people would stare at you in 
disapproval.”  
 
Road Services’ CEO stated that “what lies at the core of our success is the culture of 
collaboration produced by carrying out strategic planning.” Such a culture led the organization to 
be persistent in the search for cross-business strategic initiatives. Another manager commented 
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that:  
“We had to learn to cooperate by learning to listen to each other and to value each other’s 
viewpoint. It was tough. Different parts of the organization had different ideas about how 
best to achieve the company’s objectives and it was through listening, challenging, and 
presenting our own ideas that we eventually developed a coordinated solution.” 
 
 
This observation is synthesized in the below proposition:  
 
Proposition 4. Firms with a strong cultural proneness toward collaboration are more likely to 
formulate cross-business strategic initiatives as the business unit level, as its business units will 
have the impetus to explore possible joint initiatives and do it resiliently and persistently. 
 
 
Previous literature associates an organizational propensity to collaborate to the deliberate 
choice by the firm to create an organizational environment that rewards collegiality and 
collaboration. Such an objective may be accomplished through organizational features, as it is, 
for example, the firm’s incentive system (Kerr & Slocum, 1987; Marginson, 2002) or a statement 
of corporate values (Collins & Porras, 2002; Lencioni, 2002) that emphasize the importance of 
collaboration.  
We did not observe examples in which one business unit agreed to help another one with 
an expectation of getting a later reward in the form of corporate recognition or similar. It is worth 
remarking, although that in all the cases of business-level cross-business strategic initiatives 
discussed above, all business units expected to secure mutual and proportional benefits from the 
partnership itself. For instance, at Roadside Services, 
“…it is obvious that we would be wrong if we only take into account the costs of our road 
assistance service in a city like Seville. There are also important benefits; savings because we 
don’t outsource anymore; improvement in quality as we use our service-based trained 
mechanics, which will trigger word of mouth. On top of that, the Sales people expected that this 
initiative would lead to an increase in the number of new members easily >10% more than 
otherwise.”  
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Hence, we concluded that cross-business initiatives developed at the business level are in this 
sense similar to strategic alliances between independent firms, in which balanced contributions 
by both partners constitute a prerequisite for any agreement (Ariño & De La Torre, 1998). 
Balanced contributions are balanced when none of the partner undermines the other. Such feature 
may explain why these initiatives were rather scarce versus those resulting from corporate-
centered processes. This feature is described by the following propositions: 
 
Proposition 5. Cross-business strategic initiatives are more likely to be formulated at the 
business unit level in situations in which the extent of the benefits captured by the business units 
from the initiative is balanced.  
 
Figure 1 sums up our theoretical development. The four characteristics together produce 
impetus while a culture prone to collaboration fosters a proactive and determined attitude 
(resilience) and the persistence in the search of cross-business initiatives; guidelines allow 
vertical collaboration and integration mechanisms foster implementation. Although these 
characteristics and their effects do not guarantee the development of cross-business strategic 
initiatives at the business level, in the initiatives we analyzed they aided the development of 
cross-business collaboration. In all the four cases, the four conditions contributed to create the 
impetus, the driving force that creates and maintains the momentum to search collaboration 
across business units. Such impetuses were necessary for the development of cross-business 
collaboration initiatives as they triggered processes of discovery and analysis of potential 
initiatives by the business units.  
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
In addition to creating such impetuses, three of the characteristics identified also helped 
to support the process of exploration, negotiation, and implementation of initiatives. Corporate 
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strategic guidelines provided the necessary vertical coordination to encourage businesses to 
explore initiatives that fall within such guidelines. Such vertical coordination was not tightly 
imposed but just loosely linked to the formulated initiatives, as the corporate level does not 
prescribe the units what to do but just which are the strategic objectives are highly desirable to 
achieve by the company. Integration mechanisms eased the horizontal coordination across-
business units in two ways. First, they eased the circulation of relevant, in-depth information on 
the current activities of peer business units, and second, provided forums for the formal and 
informal exploration to develop collaboration initiatives. Finally, the firms’ cultural proneness 
toward collaboration led to a resilience search for collaboration opportunities as well as to 
persistent efforts when pursuing cross-business initiatives. 
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
This paper set off asking two questions: First, what organizational characteristics of 
multibusiness firms are conducive to the formulation of cross-business strategic initiatives at the 
business unit level? And second, in what way do such characteristics contribute toward the 
formulation of these initiatives? We observed that certain organizational arrangements, such as 
the existence of integration mechanisms across-business units; a cultural proneness toward 
collaboration; the existence of corporate strategic guidelines; and a business environment 
stimulating a sense of urgency at the corporate level, converged as factors that helped firms 
encourage and support processes leading to cross-business collaboration. In turn, we theorize that 
these characteristics have a direct effect on impetus, resilience/persistence, loose vertical 
integration and horizontal integration, as well as collective effect on impetus. 
Our analyses of the cross-business initiatives generated at the business level, which we 
identified across the three firms studied, showed that cross-business collaboration need not 
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derive necessarily from corporate-centered processes. This complements Burgelman’s (1983b) 
notions of induced and autonomous behaviors by adding nuance to the creation of the initiatives. 
The initiatives portrayed above were developed within business units and in the absence of 
specific corporate mandates but under a general umbrella strategy similar to Mintzberg, et al. 
(1998). By adding to our understanding of the relationship of autonomous and induced 
behaviors, the concepts developed here help better understand the impact on coordination in 
multibusiness firms, which adds to Ambos, et al. (2010); Birgitte (2011). Moreover, the cultural 
aspect highlighted by our data aids to our understanding of the social structures that allow 
cooperation (Casciaro & Lobo, 2008; Hansen & Lovas, 2003; Kleinbaum & Tushman, 2007; 
Martin & Eisenhardt, 2010).  
Three implications can be drawn from our research. First, cross-business strategic 
collaboration does not happen without certain organizational characteristics. Multibusiness firms 
interested in achieving a high degree of autonomous collaboration among their business units 
may benefit from securing the existence of clear corporate agenda in the form of corporate 
strategic guidelines, promoting a proactive sense of urgency at HQs, providing adequate 
integration mechanisms, and encouraging a collaborative corporate culture. These characteristics 
neither guarantee the emergence of initiatives nor their success, but proved to be conducive for 
such collaboration to emerge in the case studies discussed above. Second, we found that the 
fertile ground created by these features enabled the development of three factors that drive cross-
business collaboration extending the work of Bowman and Helfat (2001) and Goold and 
Campbell (1998). These factors are the existence of an impetus for cross-business collaboration, 
the availability of valuable information on the activities of peer business units and the existence 
of forums that enabled the exploration and development of cross-business strategic initiatives. 
Third, as shown in Table 2, successful cross-business strategic initiatives occur in a relatively 
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low proportion vis-à-vis corporate centric ones, albeit having a significant effect. It seems 
apparent that initiatives that manage to emerge and gain momentum to become eventually part of 
the officially enforced or induced strategy (Burgelman, 1983b) follow a pattern. Our proposed 
model is similar to Mirabeau and Maguire (2014) who stress the importance of impetus to start 
momentum but it differs thereafter. Although in our model coordination becomes essential, given 
that the initiatives fall within an umbrella strategy, for Mirabeau and Maguire (2014), there is a 
need to legitimize the initiative, hence harmonization the strategic and structural contexts in their 
model.  
In this paper, we develop further the theoretical discussion on corporate strategy and 
extend work on autonomous strategic behavior by shedding light on the phenomenon of cross-
business strategic initiatives in multibusiness firms where the business level nurtures initiatives. 
Our work helped to shed light on Bowman and Helfat’s (2001) claim that corporate advantage is 
not necessarily a privilege of corporate managers and, in doing so, we help to extend our 
understanding of strategies with some degree of autonomy by studying these in the realm of 
corporate strategy. In addition to the existence of objective possibilities for collaboration derived 
from factors such as business or resource relatedness, we found that a firm’s ability to develop 
cross-business collaboration derives from the existence of characteristics that are conducive to 
the development of cross-business initiatives. By identifying these specific conditions that 
nurture the development of such initiatives and explaining how they contribute to generate 
corporate advantage, we outlined how cross-business collaboration can be developed, which 
complements previous work of Kleinbaum and Tushman (2007). The challenge for practicing 
corporate managers is then to secure the existence and “health” of such conditions in their 
organizations. In other words, we posit that cross-business initiatives developed at the business 
level are essentially context dependent. This study has uncovered some of the conditions that 
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determine such dependence. Yet, further research might identify new ones. 
Like most others, our work has some limitations. Although we gathered some evidence 
showing that the initiatives studied were successful from the point of view of the business units 
developing them, our data neither enable us to make robust statements on the performance of 
such initiatives nor to contrast their relative success against those created out of corporate-
centered processes. Yet our interest was not on such performance implications, but on shedding 
light on the characteristics that support the development of these initiatives. The elements 
presented in this paper reflect a way to bring together a fresh empirically inducted theory with 
what we already know from the extant literature. By combining these sources, we provide a 
broader view of how the potential of firms to develop cross-business initiatives at the business 
level may be exploited. This view can be developed further by the particular effect of the 
characteristics identified in our work, or into the existence of additional characteristics. For 
instance, longitudinal studies could help to investigate whether these characteristics are stable 
over time and what are in turn the circumstances that determine their appearance. In addition, our 
research design was not equipped to observe the potential existence of characteristics conducive 
to cross-business collaboration at individual level, such as aspects related to managers’ 
education, experience or personality, and at the level of the team, the composition of the 
management teams at the business unit level. Finally, further work could focus on studying in 
detail the process of development of decentralized corporate value creation initiatives through 
time. In this way, the roles of the different decision levels of the firm in making initiatives move 
from the idea stage toward their full accomplishment could be better understood. 
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Tables and Figures 
TABLE 1 
   
 
   
 
 
 
  
 Number of 
 
 
      
Roadside Services      
Corporate  Chief Executive Officer  2  
Corporate  Planning and Supervision Head  2  
Corporate  Head of Operations and Postsales Area  1  
Business Unit  Marketing and Corporate Communications Director  1  
Business Unit  Head of the Commercial Area  2  
Business Unit  Head of the Products and Services Area  1  
Support Staff  Head of Strategic Planning and Development  3  
   Subtotal   12  
      
Car Systems      
Board of Directors  Chairman  1  
Board of Directors  Nonexecutive Director  1  
Corporate  Chief Executive Officer  2  
Corporate  Executive Vice President  1  
Corporate  Director of Human Resources  1  
Corporate  Chief Financial Officer  1  
Corporate  Director of Corporate Planning  1  
Corporate  Director of Sourcing and Logistics  1  
Business Unit  Director of Rear-View Systems  1  
Business Unit  Director of Command and Control Systems  1  
Business Unit  Director of Plastic and Electrical Systems  1  
  Subtotal  12  
      
Optical Products      
Corporate  Chief Executive Officer  1  
Corporate  Chief Financial Officer  2  
Corporate  Director of Human Resources  1  
Business Unit  Director of Lenses  1  
Business Unit  Director of Frames  1  
Business Unit  Director of Equipment  1  
  Subtotal  7  
      
  Total  31  
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TABLE 2  
STRATEGIC INITIATIVES AFFECTING MORE THAN ONE BUSINESS 
Firm / Initiative  Year Origin Intended “corporate effects” 
Car Systems    
Creation of Corporate Logistics 
Department 2001 Corporate Center Synergy overheads of Logistics among units 
Creation of Corporate 
Purchases Department 2001 Divisions Synergy overheads of Purchases among units 
Sharing Plants 1995 Mexico 1997 Brazil Divisions Sharing overheads of operations abroad 
Matrix organization within Divisions 1999 Corporate Center Better governance of the process of allocation of manufacturing among production facilities between business units within Divisions.  
Interdivisional committees of 
Operations 2001 Corporate Center Transferring skills between Divisions regarding Operations 
Centralization of Resource 
Allocation 1998 Corporate Center Improving efficiency of Capital Expenditures across Group 
Creation of Corporate HRM 
department 2000 Corporate Center Developing uniform HRM systems across units  
Partial centralization of R&D 2000 Corporate Center Sharing activities and knowledge in stages of R&D common to different Divisions 
Global Market Expansion 1995–2002 Corporate Center Achieve economies of scale in manufacturing, purchasing, and R&D  
Offshoring of manufacturing to 
emerging markets 1995–2002 Corporate Center Reduce cost of manufacturing 
Entrance of private equity minority 
shareholders 1997 and 1999 Corporate Center Reinforce funding for the divisions’ expansion processes 
    
Optical Products    
Homogenize Management Systems 
worldwide 2001–2003 Corporate Center Ease comparability of performance between Business Units 
Outsourcing of Logistics for all 
divisions 2001 Corporate Center Synergy overheads of Logistics among units 
Offshoring of manufacturing to 
emerging markets 1998–2004 Corporate Center Reduce cost of manufacturing 
Global Market Expansion 2000–2005 Corporate Center Achieve economies of scale in manufacturing, marketing, purchasing, and R&D  
Creation of Corporate Materials 
Department 1998 Corporate Center Optimize purchasing and procurement functions for all units 
Institutional advertising 2002 Corporate Center Increase the firm’s public profile across all its business portfolio 
Bundling market offers of 
lenses and equipment 
Offering complete eyeglasses 
2004 Business Units 
Increase joint sales of Equipment and Frames. Decrease 
overhead of Sales. Increase joint sales of Frames and Lenses. 
Decrease overhead of Sales 
Roadside Services    
Territorial Expansion 2001–2003 Corporate Center Expand to the rest of Spain 
Credit Card Expansion 2002–2004 Corporate Center Increase number of customers 
Driver’s Academy  2003 Corporate Center Penetrate new markets 
Lobby 2002 Corporate Center Offer an additional service 
Travelling Service 2001 Corporate Center Optimize existing products 
Positioning and Road 
Assistance  
2001 Business Units Expand brand name and recognition across new markets to 
help growth Penetrate new markets with flagship product 
transferring a proven product to new geographic markets 
Corporate Travelling  2003 Corporate Center Emergency response to falling market 
Channel Development 2001 Corporate Center Generate new distribution channels 
Back Office  2002 Corporate Center Reorganize back office  
Insurance 2002–2003 Corporate Center Respond to market threat 
High end travelling 2001 Corporate Center New product for high end market 
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TABLE 3  
Comprehensive Overview of the development of cross-business strategic initiatives 
Initiatives (Organization) Origin  Key Events  Descriptions from interviews 
      Bundling market 
offers  
(Optical Products) 
 
The aim was to take 
the opportunity of 
focusing on the 
optician as the 
common customer 
despite each business 
unit independent 
operation. 
 Several synergies 
between business units 
were exploited. The 
offer was based on 
selling new cutting 
machines financed by 
means of a lens and/or 
eyeglass purchasing 
contract with a below 
average discount. 
 “We needed to grow our 
cutting machines 
business when every 
optician already 
owned one. Leasing 
contracts including 
purchases of our lens 
or frames looked like a 
good idea. The Lenses 
and the Frames people 
were also struggling 
with very low growth, 
so they signed up quite 
quickly” (Managing 
Director Equipment 
Division) 
Bottom-up 
organizational 
integration (Car 
Systems) 
Despite important 
international growth 
they sourced their 
supplies locally and 
local plants had 
prevalence over 
international plants. 
These caused 
frequent clashes. 
 The three international 
divisions, 
independently from 
HQs devised an 
integrative logistic 
system that avoided 
inefficiencies and took 
power away from local 
plants.  
 “While all business units 
valued their 
independence, we all 
knew we needed to 
integrate logistics. The 
recession climate of 
2001 was the chance 
to do the homework 
once and for all.” 
(Logistics Director) 
Critical mass for 
market entry (Car 
Systems) 
 
They frequently lacked 
key resources or a 
sufficient local 
demand to justify a 
full deployment of 
anyone business in 
any target market.  
 Their solution was to the 
open “multiplants” 
managed by whoever 
division had entered the 
country first.  
 “The firm was too 
stretched after its 
European expansion 
but we had to be in 
Mexico. The multi-
plant was a low 
cost/low risk entry 
strategy that enabled 
us to make that 
otherwise impossible 
move.” (CEO)  
Brand Leveraging 
(Roadside Services) 
 
Marketing budget 
restrictions prevented 
brand positioning  
 Marketing director joined 
forces with Operations 
director thinking out of 
the box both launched 
their beachhead product 
to foster positioning  
 “We had a marketing 
plan but no resources; 
they had a product to 
launch where I wanted 
to position the brand. 
We killed two birds 
with the same stone” 
(Marketing Director) 
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TABLE 4  
Characteristics that favor the Emergence of cross-business strategic initiatives 
Characteristics Case Evidence  Effect on business unit behavior and processes Effect on cross-business initiatives  
     Sense of urgency Cut costs quickly and drastically  (Car Systems)  Increase geographic scope (Car Systems) Grow profitably in core (but saturated) market to fund international expansion (Optical Products)  Be first mover in national expansion before other regional players do   (Roadside Services) 
 
Impetus to find new  opportunities    
 Trigger  development of initiatives   
Corporate Guidelines 
(Simple rules) 
 
A vision of being global and a Tier 1 supplier, without compromising their family business style (Car 
Systems) Need to develop global sourcing process (Car Systems) To reinforce corporate image under the same brand (Optical Products) To take advantage of being only firm diversified around all needs of the optician (Optical Products) Coordination to achieve a high aspirations of expansion with minimal costs  (Roadside Services) 
 
Vertical 
Coordination of action through communication of priorities (“tagging”) and by setting   boundary conditions for  strategic initiatives  
 Trigger development of initiatives and provides strategic focus    
Integration 
mechanisms  
  
Collaboration crystallized by increasing communication instances (Car Systems) Collaboration enhanced by clustering all business units management within the same building  (Optical Products) All major businesses grouped in new territories 
Roadside Services 
 Horizontal 
Coordination of action through forums for analysis and discussion and exchange of relevant information  
 Trigger development of initiatives and facilitate the process of exploration, negotiation and implementation of initiatives   
Collaboration strong 
part of 
national/corporate 
values  
Mission and vision statements prioritize value of teamwork and knowledge sharing (Car Systems)  Bonus partially linked to overall firm Performance (Car Systems) Informal expectation from corporate management that business unit leaders are well aware of their peer business units strategic initiatives (Car 
Systems) Mission and vision statements emphasizing importance of teamwork and warning against individualism  (Optical Products) Bonus partially linked to overall firm performance (Optical Products) Enhance regional pride by occupying new territories (Roadside Services) Core operations in national environment/s supporting organic, relationship-based, collectivist view of organizations (all the cases) 
 
Impetus to find new opportunities and persistence to make them happen 
Trigger development of initiatives and creates drive to achieve positive outcomes 
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FIGURE 1 
Characteristics and their impact on the development of cross-business strategic initiatives originated at 
the business level 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sense of Urgency under resource scarcity 
Cultural proneness  
towards collaboration 
Corporate Strategic  
guidelines 
Formal and Informal  
Horizontal Integration  
Mechanisms 
Impact  on  
strategic initiatives 
Horizontal coordination 
Catalyze process of exploration,  
Negotiation, and implementation  
of initiatives   
Persistence, resilience 
Strong drive to achieve positive  
outcomes 
Vertical loose coordination 
Secure strategic focus keeping  
significant degrees of freedom for  
autonomous behavior 
Characteristics  of the  
Context 
Impetus 
Trigger development of initiatives 
  
46 
 
 
 
 
